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We show in a two-period world with endogenous savings and two assets,
one of them exhibiting a stochastic return that an interest adjusted income
tax is optimal. This tax leaves a safe component of interest income tax free
and taxes the excess return with a special tax rate. There is no trade off
between risk allocation and efﬁciency in intertemporal consumption. Both
goals are reached. As the resulting tax system divides income into three
parts, the tax can also be called a triple income tax. This distinction and a
special tax rate on the excess return is necessary in order to have an optimal
risk shifting effect.
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884101.1 Introduction
In a world without uncertainty and distributional considerations the optimal tax
structure for ﬁnancing public expenditure is lump sum. In case of uncertainty
about the individual wage rate, so called private risk, this statement does not hold.
Eaton and Rosen (1980) showed in their seminal paper that for a one-period world
with endogenous labor choice an income tax with a strictly positive marginal tax
rate improves welfare. The government pools the private risk of all individuals
and uses a lump sum transfer in order to return the tax revenue. The income
tax takes the function of a social insurance scheme against private risk. Varian
(1980) showed similar effects for a two-period world where the households work
for a known wage rate and have to choose between consumption and savings. In
his analysis, individuals face private risk because of uncertainty about the best
investment portfolio.
Richter and Wiegard (1991) examine a model with aggregate risk and endoge-
nous savings. In their two-period model the households have inelastic labor sup-
ply in period zero and divide their exogenous labor income between consumption
and savings. Consumption in the following period is ﬁnanced by savings and a
stochastic interest income. Richter and Wiegard show that a tax on this risky in-
terest income improves welfare under certain conditions. The optimal tax rate is a
trade-off between efﬁciency and insurance. Therefore, it depends on the elasticity
of current consumption with respect to a compensated relative change of the tax
rate. Further they show that a consumption tax cannot achieve this insurance func-
tion. Related studies have been done by Richter (1992). He examines the portfolio
choice decision in a two asset world with one exhibiting a stochastic return and
one safe asset. Richter develops an optimal elasticity rule for the taxation of asset
returns and demonstrates that a cash ﬂow tax is not optimal, if tax rates are not
differentiated.
These results suggest that in case of uncertainty a consumption tax is always in-
ferior compared to an income tax. This is because an income tax provides superior
insurance by taxing capital income and the sacriﬁce of a distorted intertemporal
consumption decision is more than compensated by the reduction of risk.
1But, we show in our paper that this sacriﬁce is not necessary. First, by using
a adequately deﬁned tax system, we can achieve both insurance and intertem-
poral efﬁciency. Second, we are able to show, that the resulting optimal tax
scheme is a modern form of consumption taxation. Precisely, we will get a kind of
consumption-orientated income tax with interest adjustment (see i.e., Rose 1999,
pp. 35ff). In contrast to Richter and Wiegard, we can state that a consumption tax
is able to insure against risk in capital income.
The remainder of the paper will be as follows. In section 2 we present the
model and examine the household choice, whereas section 3 discusses the optimal
tax structure for a welfare maximum. The paper closes with some conclusions.
2 The Model and Household Choice
AsinRichterandWiegard(1991), weuseatwo-periodmodelwithoutanybequest
motive. There is a homogenous individual, receiving exogenous labor income y in
period one and dividing it on ﬁrst period consumption c0 and savings s0. Savings
can be invested in an asset A0 with a certain return r > 0 and in a risky asset A1,
which has a stochastic return ˜ x ≥ −1. We assume E[˜ x] > r. Savings are the only
source of consumption in the second period.
The government can use both a proportional wage taxtL in the ﬁrst period1 and
a tax on interest income. For capital income taxation we follow the approach of
Hilgers and Schindler (2002) and use a two-part interest income tax. We tax the
safe return r in both assets with rate t0 and the ”excess return” (˜ x−r) with rate t1
and assume full loss offset. If the realization of the excess return is negative, this
loss will lead to a tax refund of t1 ·(˜ x−r). All tax revenue is used to ﬁnance a
public good g in period 1.2
The savings can now be written as s0 =A0+A1 =(1−tL)y−c0. Consumption
in period 1 is ˜ c1 =[(1−t1)(˜ x−r)A1+[1+r(1−t0)]]((1−tL)y−c0). We assume
1This wage tax is equivalent to a lump sum tax.
2In the Hilgers/Schindler model there is no labor income, but the tax system for capital income
is equivalent. The idea is having enough instruments for pursuing two goals, namely an optimal
resource allocation as well as an efﬁcient risk diversiﬁcation.
2that the representative investor is risk averse in both private and public consump-
tion. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is additive separable and
takes the form
W = E[U(c0, ˜ c1)]+E[V(˜ g)] with Uc > 0;Ucc < 0;Vg > 0;Vgg < 0.
Unlike Richter and Wiegard we do not take E[˜ g] as given. In this model, the
government chooses the tax rates and the tax revenue is used completely to ﬁnance
the public good. Therefore, the probability distribution of ˜ g is also an instrument
variable of the government.
The household maximizes his expected utility W for given tax rates by choos-
ing his optimal ﬁrst period consumption c0 and his optimal savings A0 +A1 =
(1−tL)y−c0 with respect to his budget constraint. He does not anticipate the
effect of his saving behavior on the level of the public good. Inserting the budget








The ﬁrst order conditions of the household problem are:
¶W
¶c0
= E[Uc0]−E[Uc1 ·[1+r(1−t0)]] = 0 (2)
¶W
¶A1
= (1−t1)E[Uc1 ·(˜ x−r)] = 0 (3)
Optimal values of c, A1 and s are denoted c0 = c0(t0,t1,tL), A1 = A1(t0,t1,tL)




−1 = r(1−t0) (4)
Equation (3) indicates that our tax system does not distort portfolio choice, as
the FOC is equal to the optimality condition in case of no taxation.
Proposition 1:
The tax rate t1 on the excess return (˜ x−r) does not affect overall
savings s0(t0,t1,tL) as ¶c0
¶t1 = 0. Further, t1 has only a substitution




Let pr = 1+r(1−t0) and pA = (1−t1)(˜ x−r). Totally differentiating equations










































 · A1·dt1 (5)
Using Cramer’s Rule, we get ¶c0
¶t1 = 0, as the modiﬁed determinant det adt1A1 in
the nominator equals zero, and ¶A1
¶t1 = A1
1−t1 as det ac0dt1 = det ac0A1 · A1
1−t1. 2
This result corresponds to the Sandmo result for taxing capital gains3 and is
similar to the portfolio choice result for a net tax in case of several risky assets
(Sandmo 1977). As investing more in the risky asset according to ¶A1
¶t1 = A1
1−t1 and
diminishing the investment in the safe asset by the same amount and therefore
keeping both ﬁrst period and second period consumption constant, the tax rate
change in t1 does not change expected utility of the household.
3 Optimal Taxes on Interest Income
Assume that the tax revenue of the wage tax in period 0 is invested only in the
safe asset. Thus, in period 1, the budget restriction can be written:
˜ g = (1+r)tL·y+t1(˜ x−r)·A1(t0,t1,tL)+t0r·((1−tL)y−c0(t0,t1,tL)
The government chooses now the tax rates and the public good g in order to max-






3See Sandmo (1969), Section 8.




















































Then, we can conclude:
Proposition 2:
An optimal income tax system in case of exogenous labor income and
risky returns to at least one asset does not tax the safe rate of return
(t0 = 0). Further, the optimal tax rate on the excess return (˜ x−r) is
strictly positive and in the open interval t1 ∈ (0;1), if the households
are risk averse in both private and public consumption. The tax on
wage income is used to equate marginal utility of public and private
consumption in period 1.
Proof:




















5and therefore, t0 = 0.
For t0 = 0, from (7) and (9) follows E[Uc1] = E[Vg]. Using FOC (3) of the
household problem and (10), we can write
E[Uc1 ·(˜ x−r)] = 0 = E[Vg·(˜ x−r)].
As E[Y ·Z] = E[Y]·E[Z]+Cov(Y,Z) and E[Uc1] = E[Vg], this expression can
be simpliﬁed to Cov(Uc1, ˜ x)= Cov(Vg, ˜ x). But, this is only possible for t1 ∈ (0;1).
2
If t1 is set optimally, we have Cov(Uc1, ˜ x) = Cov(Vg, ˜ x). As the households
are risk averse in both private and public consumption, in an optimum, the risk
must be diversiﬁed on both types of consumption. This diversiﬁcation depends on
the relative strength of the risk aversion in private consumption compared to the
one in public consumption. Therefore, the tax rate t1 depends on this relative risk
aversion: The higher the risk aversion in private consumption relative to the one
in public consumption, the higher the tax rate on the excess return (˜ x−r) .
As the government returns the risk to the households by providing a public
good, our result is general and independent of any assumption concerning the
ability of the government to deal better with risk than the capital market or not.
Further we tax ex-post income. Thus, the government fully participates in all in-
come risk and the critic of Bulow and Summers (1984) does not apply. But, if
we assume risk neutrality in public consumption, we get as special case t1 = 1
and all risk is concentrated in public consumption. This would be in accordance
with the Arrow-Lind Theorem, where the government can diversify aggregate risk
perfectly. Finally, we can state:
Proposition 3:
If an interest adjusted income tax is implemented, taxing the excess
returnaccordingtoProposition2(t1 ∈(0;1))andlettingthesafecom-
ponent of interest yield tax free (t0 = 0), an efﬁcient risk allocation is
achieved without disturbing the intertemporal consumption decision.
6There is no trade-off between risk and efﬁciency in allocation. The
marginal rate of time preference equals the safe rate of return (r = r).
Proof:
From (4), the marginal rate of time preference is r = r·(1−t0). For t0 = 0, r = r.
In the optimum, the marginal rate of time preference is then independent of the tax
rates and the intertemporal consumption decision is not distorted. Additionally,
Cov(Uc1, ˜ x) = Cov(Vg, ˜ x) assures efﬁcient risk allocation. 2
As mentioned above, Richter and Wiegard (1991) show that a traditional con-
sumption tax cannot achieve the insurance function of an income tax in case of
risky capital income. Richter (1992) shows the same result for a cash-ﬂow tax.
But is it true that an income tax does always better? Examining our results, this
view must be handled with care.
We use a proportional wage tax on exogenous labor income in the ﬁrst period.
The safe rate of return on savings is tax-free, whereas the excess return or super-
normal proﬁts are taxed with a special tax rate. This tax scheme, however, equals
a modiﬁed consumption-orientated income tax with interest adjustment.4 There-
fore, wehaveaconsumptiontax, whichoptimallyprovidesinsuranceagainstrisky
capital income and simultaneously avoids a distortion in the intertemporal con-
sumption decision.
This tax scheme can also be named a triple income tax as we divide the full
income in three different parts. The excess return (or risk premium) is one of it.
This distinction is necessary for achieving an optimal risk allocation by taxation.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. On the one hand, it is
optimal to diversify the aggregate risk between private and public consumption.
On the other hand, risk shifting has negative welfare effects by disturbing the
intertemporal consumption decision, if we tax the risky asset with only one tax
rate. In this case, there is a trade-off and the optimal tax rate depends on the
4A consumption-orientated income tax with interest adjustment taxes the overall labor income
and tax-exempts interest income. For excess returns in capital income a tax with the same tax rate
as for labor income is possible. See i.e., Rose 1999, pp. 35ff.
7strength of these effects (see i.e., Richter 1992, Richter and Wiegard 1991). If we
tax instead the excess return with a special tax rate, the tax system is well deﬁned
and the trade-off can be avoided. Thus, we reach both optimal risk allocation and
efﬁciency in intertemporal consumption simultaneously.
4 Conclusions
We showed that an interest adjusted income tax can guarantee a welfare maximum
in a two-period world with two assets, one of them exhibiting a stochastic return.
The excess return must be taxed separately and possible losses in this tax base
must be subsidized. In case of risk aversion in public consumption, we have
an inner optimum with t1 ∈ (0;1) because the risk must be diversiﬁed on both
consumption types for having an optimal risk allocation.
As such a tax system is a kind of indirect consumption taxation, we showed
that a consumption tax is able to insure against risky interest income.
A disadvantage of our tax system may be that individuals have an incentive
to declare labor income as preferred taxed capital income in order to avoid taxes.
This problem is similar to the case of a dual income tax with separate tax rates for
labor and capital income.
Related work is done in a multi-asset world with a ﬁxed amount of savings. In
such a world, Richter (1992) and Christiansen (1993) show that there is a trade-
off between risk allocation and optimal portfolio choice. If the same tax system is
introduced as in this paper, this trade-off should also be overcome.5 Further work
couldalsoexamineamulti-assetworldwithendogenoussavingsandlabor-supply.
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